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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 59

December, 1956

Number 1

JURIDICAL TRAUMA AND MEDICAL SHOCK*
(A FEW PomNrs OF CONTACr BETwEEN LAW AND MEDICna
HENRY

)

H. Fos=E, J .**

Introduction
MEDiCNE is married to science, the law at least is a jealous
mistress. And the tie that binds them together is more than mere
infatuation. If there are moments of friction, there is also occasional
rapport. In any event, the liaison is not a passing fancy, and common areas of interest perpetuate a somewhat ambivalent relation.
Although it would take a Kathleen Windsor or a Marcel Proust to
relate a complete case history of this romance, perhaps we may
briefly examine a few of the points of contact between law and
medicine.

JF

First of all, we might observe that we are living in an age of
specialization and fragmentation. It used to be that lawyers and
doctors were authentic "jacks of all trades." Today our professions
are split up into specialties. There seems to be a mania to split
things, whether they be hairs, atoms, infinitives, or fees. All too
often, what now passes for "higher" education consists of compartmentalized training and the learning of an esoteric vernacular which
blocks communication with the outside world. This, I am told, has
been diagnosed as the disease of "jargon asphasia." In any event,
communication failure leads to misunderstanding or impairs understanding, and over-specialization, I suspect, leads to an intellectual
provincialism. To a great extent the friction between our professions
arises due to corresponding narrow points of view and a failure to
* The substance of this paper was delivered as a lecture before a joint
assembly of the Schools of Law and Medicine of West Virginia University, on
April 27, 1956, in observance of Medical Education Week.
** Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
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understand the problems and perspective of each other's profession.
In our quest for technical expertness we may have neglected the art
of empathy and have spawned technicians rather than doctors and
lawyers.
Infrequently, we do pause long enough in our specializations
to examine the implications of a narrow training. Some law faculties tolerate courses in Jurisprudence, and I suppose the general
practitioner comes in for some kind words at medical college. But
the bulk of legal education, and I imagine a large part of medical
education, consists of rather narrow classifications of subject matter
into tight little compartments, isolated and secure from exposure to
outside influences and ideas. A doctor might regard this as a quarantine, or a lawyer as a sequestration, of knowledge. This "hardening of the categories" is bad enough inter se, but when it occasions
a loss of contact between the arts and sciences, it is a pernicious
malady. We sorely need integration of subject matter and the crossfertilization of ideas, for both law and medicine comprehend vast
areas of knowledge and many skills and techniques.
But the picture may not be so dark as just painted. Fortunately,
there is a new awareness that over-specialization may be selfdefeating. At least we are talking about it, and in due time, something may be done about it. Many of us have been stimulated by
the lively interplay which may occur on an inter-professional level.
Civic clubs, societies, and groups, have sponsored joint programs
on law and medicine. Medico-legal symposiums or clinics have
been held under the auspices of bar and medical associations. Dr.
Hubert Winston Smith has staged many such programs throughout
the country. The American Bar Association reports that in about
half the states, bar associations now maintain some form of direct
and continuing liaison with state medical societies for the purpose
of considering mutual problems and coordinating their activities in
the medico-legal field. An inter-professional code has been developed in Wisconsin. The American Medical Association has established a legal department under the direction of Joseph Stetler
which closely follows recent legal developments. Thus, our professions are providing machinery for closer cooperation and continuing

inter-relation, and we are acquiring the means for attacking joint
problems.
Not only have our professional associations come to recognize
that unfamiliarity breeds discontent, but our educators are waking
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up too. There is a lot of talk these days about "core curricula" and
"integration of subjects." On the professional school level, "released
time" is being sought so that other disciplines may be incorporated
into professional education. Several law schools now offer courses
in medical jurisprudence and the University of Texas, for example,
has established a Law-Science Institute which includes a comprehensive curriculum for medico-legal education. The law school at
West Reserve University has a similar institute under the able
directorship of Professor Oliver Schroeder and it may be predicted
that other law schools will launch similar undertakings within the
near future.
Legal periodicals are giving increasing attention to medico-legal
materials. The current issue of the Index to Legal Periodicals,lists
two and one-half columns of titles under the heading "Medical
Jurisprudence." A check of back issues of the Index shows that in
the nine year period from 1946 to 1955, there were 18 articles on
"Medicine," 4 on "Nurses," and 70 on "Physicians and Surgeons,"
and 90 on "Medical Jurisprudence," for a total of 182 such articles
in legal journals. In the nine year period from 1898 to 1907, there
was a total of 15 such articles; in the fifteen year period from 19081922, a total of 54; in the nine-year period from 1923-1931 a total
of 94. Not only has there been an increase in the number of articles
appearing in established journals, but in the past few years several
law reviews have devoted entire issues to medical legal matters,
and within the past five years at least three new journals have been
founded which are directed almost exclusively to forensic science
and medico-legal matters. Thus the need for such materials has
been appreciated and they are being made available.
Fortunately, lawyers and legal educators are beginning to perceive the realities of modem practice. The significance of medicine
in the judicial process becomes apparent when we consider that in
about ninety per cent of all civil cases heard by juries, medical testimony is offered, and in over half the cases heard by our appellate
courts, medical evidence is part of the record.1 When we remember
that at least since the code of Justinian (530 A. D.) medical opinion
has been required by courts in some cases, we realize that the
medical expert is not a newcomer to the legal arena. It has been
1 Regan, Medical Legal Problems-The Physician's and Lawyer's Viewpoint, MEDIco-LEGAL SYmnosru'mS 11, 13-14 (mimeographed by Law Department, American Medical Association, 1956.
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estimated that seven out of ten personal injury cases really hinge on
the medical evidence produced rather than upon questions of liability.2 Despite the importance of such evidence, our law school
tradition has been to ignore it and to concentrate on the liability
problem. Obviously, in this respect, legal education has been inadequate. On the other hand, the medical student may fare but little
better in learning about a doctor's legal rights and duties. Thus, due
to deficiencies in education the seeds of suspicion and mistrust may
be sown and it may become increasingly difficult to appreciate the
problems and the view point of the other profession. In order to
serve justice, and in order to serve man, we must discard our blinders
and seek understanding so that the great talents of each profession
may be more fully utilized for the causes we most surely accept as
being our mutual concern.
Since the points of contact and the areas of friction between
law and medicine are manifold, the dictates of time require a somewhat arbitrary selection of sub-topics which usually are of interest
to both professions. First, we will consider contract law and the
doctor; secondly, tort law and the doctor; thirdly, the doctor as a
citizen, and; finally, legal control-or governmental regulation-of
the doctor and medicine.3
Contract Law and the Doctor
The relationship between physician and patient usually is described as "consensual," but it is misleading and inaccurate to think
of it wholly in terms of contracts. The relationship involves much
more than mere private agreement. The law imposes certain duties
and obligations, independent of any private understanding, and
hence in some respects the relation is more one of status than contract. However, ordinarily, there is no legal duty to take individual
cases nor to serve a particular patient, and theoretically, the doctor
4
has complete freedom of choice in that regard.
Small, PersonalInjury Law, 41 A.B.A.J. 693 (1955).
Acknowledgment is made of my indebtedness to Professor Burke Shartel
of the University of Michigan whose mimeographed materials on Medical
Jurisprudence are most helpful. Moreover, many of the citations are culled
2
3

from RfcAN, THE DocToR AN PATmNr AND THE LAW

(2d ed. 1949).

4

Query: Suppose an emergency occurs in the physician's presence, does
he have any legal duty to render first aid? Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind.
416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901), holds no legal duty, sed quaere.
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From the standpoint of contract law, the physician-patient
relation begins when the physician responds to the express or implied request that he attend the prospective patient and undertakes
to do so. It is only when the patient no longer needs professional
services, or when the doctor is otherwise properly relieved of his
obligation, that the relation terminatesY Usually, the relation endures until the patient recovers or dies, but it may be terminated at
any time by either party. However, if the physician withdraws, he
should afford the patient reasonable opportunity to acquire another
doctor, and if he arbitrarily abandons the patient, there may be
liability for harm occasioned by such neglect. The relation also is
terminated if the physician becomes incapable of attending the
patient. If he wishes, the doctor may limit his undertaking so as to
treat only a particular ailment, or to render services only at a particular place or for a particular time.
The contractual undertaking of the physician is usually interpreted as one to render service, not to effect a cure, and there is no
implied warranty that the patient will be benefited by the treatment,6 unless the physician, unwisely, has specifically agreed to
effect a cure or to better the condition. 7
The agreement for medical care may be an express one, one
undertaken by an office assistant, or implied from the facts. It need
not be formal. The late Dr. Regan, in his valuable book,s says that
more than one doctor has stopped on the highway to give emergency
first aid, not intending to assume any further responsibility, told the
injured person to go to a hospital for efiiergency treatment, and
later been sued by the beneficiary of his kindness for allegedly
abandoning the care of the patient. In such cases the issue of fact
may be resolved against the doctor if the jury feels that the doctor
did not do enough under the circumstances.
Note that the relationship is regarded as personal. The patient
is contracting for the physician's best judgment, hence the latter
cannot delegate functions requiring special skills to another or
substitute. To do so may be regarded as abandonment of the patient
5 Lawson v. Conway, 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S.E. 564 (1892).
6 E:GAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 54.
7The Code of Hammurabi, which existed in Babylon from about 2250
B.C., imposed an insurer's liability upon physicians and surgeons, and the
penalty
for an unsuccessful operation might be death or loss of a hand.
8
RE:c,
DocToR AND PATmrr AND = LAw 56-57 (2d ed. 1949).
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and malpractice. In Young v. Jordan,9 a physician administered
medicine to induce labor, then failed to return within a few hours
or to remain where he could be reached as he had promised, and
after considerable suffering the patient finally procured another physician for the delivery. The West Virginia court held that there had
been a breach of duty and that the doctor was liable for the suffering
caused by his neglect.
However, where the physician properly dressed a wound and
found it in apparently good condition twenty-four hours later, temporarily absented himself on business, and left the patient in the
care of a competent nurse and assistant, the West Virginia court held
that there had been no abandonment of the patient. 10 Of course, the
basic question in these cases is whether the physician behaved reasonably under the circumstances. On the other hand, the doctor
cannot be expected to devote all of his time to one patient, but on
the.other, he must give each patient proper attention. He may not
avoid liability for neglecting a patient on the excuse that he had
more patients than he could properly handle," yet the needs of
other patients must be considered in the allotment of time.
Much the same reasoning would apply to a doctor's refusal to
make a call late at night We have the word of no less an authority
than Lord Macauley that it will hardly be maintained that a surgeon
ought to be treated as a murderer for refusing to go from Calcutta to
Meerut to perform an operation. There is no legal duty to do so.
As previously stated, the physician-patient relationship begins by consent. But once the relationship has been established, the physician
is obligated to render reasonable care and treatment and clearly,
under some circumstances, it would be unreasonable to fail to respond to an emergency call from a patient regardless of the personal
inconvenience to the doctor.
The duty of the physician is not affected by the fact that his
services are being given gratuitously, nor by the fact that some
third person rather than the patient is paying the fee. 12 Moreover,
the patient is liable for any fee he has agreed to pay unless there is
some fraud or misrepresentation, except that a contingent fee, based
upon the size of the patient's recovery in a personal injury action
9 106 W. Va. 189, 145 S.E. 41 (1928).
10 Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922).
11 Sinclair v. Brunson, 212 Mich. 887, 180 N.W. 858 (1920).
12 Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 8 P.2d 109 (1932).
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(although proper for legal services) would probably be held an
improper basis for a medical fee. In Early v. Shelter Ice Cream
Co., 13 the West Virginia court held that a contract to pay a medical
witness for testifying, coupled with the condition that the right to
compensation was contingent upon winning the suit, was void as
contrary to public policy due to the possibility that it might influence
the nature of the testimony. However, in a few states, physicians or
nurses rendering services to accident victims have liens for their
services upon any amount the patient may recover in a law suit for
such injuries.
If there is no agreement as to size of the fee, a physician is
entitled to a "reasonable fee," and usually it will be a jury question
as to what is deemed to be "reasonable." The testimony of colleagues will be important. Such factors as time spent, difficulty and
delicacy of the service or operation, customary fees, materials used,
the doctor's standing in the profession, and the patient's ability to
pay (in some states) will be considered. An infant or insane person
may make his assets liable for necessary medical services, and even
an unconscious patient treated in an emergency, is liable for a
reasonable fee. A fake charity patient is also liable for a fee. A husband, as head of the family has the legal obligation to support, and
generally is liable for medical services provided to his wife or children, but he has a right to be consulted in the choice of a doctor,
and if he chooses another physician, the wife or child's choice may
be unable to collect from him. Usually, a third person is not liable
for medical services furnished another, but if he expressly undertakes such responsibility, he may be, and under workmen's compensation statutes a fund or insurance carrier or employer may be
liable for medical care given to an injured worker.
Photographs, X-ray plates, records, belong to the doctor subject
to the patient's control of their public use. This means that there
should be no public use of the patient's likeness or case history without the knowledge and (preferably written) consent of the patient,
otherwise the doctor may be liable for the invasion of right of privacy which is recognized as a tort in many states. The first American
case which recognized privacy as a legally protected interest was
De May v. Roberts,14 decided by the Michigan court in 1881. Recovery was allowed against a physician who unnecessarily permitted
13 108 W. Va. 184, 150 S.E. 539 (1929).
14 46 Mich. 160,9 N.W. 146 (1881).
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an unmarried, nonprofessional man to accompany him at childbirth
without the patient's knowing his true status. In a recent unreported
case, a doctor and a hospital were sued for allowing internes and
nurses to be spectators in the delivery room.' 5 The responsibility of
the doctor goes beyond tolerating trespassing kibitizers, and the
cases indicate an implied agreement on his part not to humiliate or
embarrass his patient nor to make public confidential or personal
matters. In Feeney v. Young,' 6 the patient recovered in her suit
against her doctor where although she had orally consented to the
taking of movies of her Caesarian operation for exhibition to medical societies in the interest of science she had not consented to the
public exhibition of such pictures in a film entitled "Birth" at regular
movie houses. In Banks v. King Features Syndicate,'7 the unauthorized newspaper publication of an X-ray picture of a woman's
abdomen was held actionable, and presumably the doctor who supplied the X-ray would also have been liable if he had been joined in
the suit. In short, there is a legal duty imposed upon doctors to
abide by the dictates of good taste and decency and to respect the
confidential and personal character of their professional relation to
their patients. There is an implied undertaking to this effect.
Insofar as his relation to contract law is concerned, by far the
most important problem for the doctor is the legal requirement of
consent for operations or treatment. The law, out of regard for the
physical integrity of the individual, considers any unpermitted or
unprivileged contact with the person of another a battery. In medical cases the question usually is whether or not there was actual
or implied consent to the treatment or operation. If there was, the
contact was privileged and the doctor is not liable. The general rule
is that a physician must obtain the consent of the patient or someone
authorized to give it for him. Of course, consent may be inferred
from acquiescence when the patient knows what he is doing. However it will not be implied contrary to express prohibitions or conditions of which the physician has knowledge, as where the doctor
knows the patient would not agree to what he proposes to do. It is
doubtful that the law would imply consent in the face of a known
15 See also Griffin v. Medical Society, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1989).
10 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1920).
1730 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See also Barber v. Time, 848 Mo.
1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), where Time was held liable for invasion of
privacy for printing pictures of plaintiff taken during a humiliating illness and
reproducing them under the caption "starving glutton". Presumably, a doctor,
supplying such pictures, likewise would be liable.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss1/2

8

Foster: Juridical Trauma and Medical Shock

JURIDICAL TRAUMA
refusal by a mentally competent adult, even where the medical facts
indicate the alternative will be death. Probably, most courts would
regard an operation on a known Christian Scientist, undertaken
without consent from anyone, as a battery, although consent perhaps
might be implied where such a patient is unconscious, it is a life or
death matter, and there is no time to contact relatives.
In a recent unreported Ohio case,' 8 a patient who had been
injured in a fall a year later suffered from unbearable headaches,
and the defendant doctor performed a spinal column operation
(cervical laminectomy and posterior rhisotomy). After the patient
failed to get over his headaches he returned to the hospital for further observation and treatment. He complained that any movement
caused him pain. Despite the protests and resistance of the patient
and protests from his wife, one of the doctors seized the patient's
head, turned it from side to side several times, compelled the patient
to get out of bed, forced him to walk out to the hall where he left
him while he answered a telephone call. The appellate court held
that there had been a technical assault and battery on a sick and
weak man with resulting injuries, and that it was question of fact
for the jury as to whether or not there was an implied consent to
the methods employed. It is to be noted that the plaintiff's theory of
liability in this case is based upon unauthorized as distinguished from
negligent acts and that the decision of the crucial fact issue was
entrusted to the jury, it being the final arbiter as to whether or not
the treatment given was so extreme as to exceed the bounds of any
actual or implied consent.
An Oklahoma case held that an anesthetist but not the surgeon
was liable for a technical assault in giving a patient a spinal block
contrary to wishes expressed to the surgeon and noted by him on the
hospital chart which the anesthetist read but failed to follow, 1 9
and the rule is fairly well established in most jurisdictions that a
patient's express or implied consent must be obtained for operations.
Ordinarily, consent of an unconscious patient will be implied
in emergency situations, or where a surgeon runs into unanticipated
difficulties during an operation, but where practicable, the wise
surgeon will exercise reasonable and diligent efforts (time permitting) to obtain proper authorization from the appropriate relative.
1 Discussed by Morris, Medical Malpractice a Changing Picture, 28 INs.

CouNsEL J. 28, 27-80 (1956).
19 Woodson v. Huey, 261 P.2d 199 (Okla. 1958).
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In order to protect himself, it may be wise to call in consultants so
that the emergency character of the situation may be readily established.
In the usual case of scheduled operations, it is standard practice
to have an authority for the operation executed in advance, which
covers possible contingencies that may develop during the course
of the operation, and leaves what should be done to the discretion
and judgment of the surgeon. The problem in legal drafting here
is to give the doctor the benefit of express consent to cover possible
developments but not to make the authority such a blanket coverage
as to be meaningless and hence ineffectual. 20 Only the operation
specifically consented to may be performed, unless the need for further surgery, essential to the preservation of life or health, develops
or becomes apparent during the course of the operation. No separate,
unrelated, or entirely different operation is within the bounds of the
original consent, and being unconsented to, amounts to a battery.
For example, consent to an operation of the right ear does not imply
consent to an operation on the left ear,21 consent to an appendectomy
does not imply the same as to removal of Fallopian tubes, 22 authority
for a hysterectomy does not cover an appendectomy, 23 ali operation
on the wrong leg may be actionable, 24 removal of the patient's teeth
without consent is actionable, 25 and any operation beyond that
which was directed,2 may result in tort liability unless the court or
jury deems that the emergency character of the situation obviates
the lack of actual consent and issufficient to raise an implied consent to what was done. The surgeon has the burden of proving that
in fact it was an emergency and that the unanticipated surgery was
essential to save the patient's life or health and not merely expedient,
and prudence dictates that consultants be called in to establish such
facts.
20

REGA, op. cit. supra note 8, at 61. In Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal. App.
2d 485, 96 P.2d 142 (1939), the court referred to blanket consent forms and
said: "We do not understand such agreement to constitute a consent to perform operations other than the one which the operating surgeons were engaged

by the plaintiff to perform unless necessity therefor arose during the authorized
operation."

21 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
Compare Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N.E. 910 (1919),

22

and King v. Carney, 85 Okla. 62, 204 Pac. 270 (1922).

23 Church v. Adler, 350 IlM. App. 471, 113 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
24 MOOSv.United States, 118 F. Supp. 275 (D.C. Mmu. 1954).
25
Ehlen v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App.2d 141, 124 P.2d 82 (1942).
2
6Russell v. Jackson, 37 Wn.2d 66, 221 P.2d 516 (1950).
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Where an operation will or is apt to result in sterility, any
spouse of the patient is concerned, and it is desirable to obtain the
consent of both husband and wife before such an operation. If an
operation is illegal, such as a criminal abortion, consent of the patient will be nugatory in the criminal law, and although the patient's
consent may preclude her suit in tort, her parent may have a cause
of action against the physician. 27 Where surgery is for nontherapeutic
purposes, such as "face lifting", the surgeon may run a risk in some
states that such an operation is not warranted where there is no
therapeutic necessity, and in any event the surgeon had best be sure
that the patient understands the possible dangers as well as the
advantages that are involved.
In the case of a patient who lacks legal capacity, such as an
infant (usually anyone under twenty-one) or an insane person,
consent for operation or treatment should be obtained from one
legally competent to give it, such as a parent, guardian, spouse or
relative. In the absence of such consent, the doctor runs a risk that
he commits an assault and battery, unless he has made diligent
effort to get such consent or the emergency is such that the requirement is dispensed with due to exceptional circumstances.28 Moreover, the doctor assumes a risk that the adult from whom he obtained the consent was legally authorized to bestow it, and in a
held that a sister had no such authority to speak
Texas case it was
29
for the parents.
Where an operation is made compulsory by law, such as vaccination or sterilization, the law furnishes the consent and the doctor
acting in compliance therewith does not commit a battery, unless
perhaps when the law is unconstitutional.3 0
It should also be noted that if it is found that the patient's consent was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, the consent may
be disregarded and the surgeon treated as if he operated without
any consent whatsoever.3 1
27
See W. VA. CODE C. 30, art. 6, § 8 (Michie 1955), and Billingsley v.
Clelland, 41 W. Va. 234, 23 S.E. 812 (1895).

Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951).
Com. App. 1920).
o REGA, op. cit. supranote 8, at 66.
3
lBirnbaum v. Siegler, 273 App. Div. 817, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1948);

28
29

Moss v. Eishworth, 222 S.W. 225 (Tex.

3

Fausette v. Grim, 236 Fed. 681 (8th Cir. 1916); Zoterell v. Repp, 187 Mich.
319, 153 N.W. 692 (1915) (consent must be "understandingly" given).
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Dr. Regan raises the interesting problem of a postmortem Caesarian section, and concludes that although consent should be
obtained from the husband if possible, if he is not available, the
32
operation would be privileged.
Not 6nly must there be express or implied consent to examinations or operations, but the consent of spouse or next of kin usually
is essential for an autopsy. In West Virginia, it is a misdemeanor to
send a body to an undertaker without first making inquiry as to the
wishes of next of kin. 3
In summary, although the physician-patient relation is consensual, many duties and responsibilities are imposed and implied
by law and the private parties are subject to the overriding considerations of public policy. It also should be noted that medical
science affects the law of contracts in that the legal conclusion as to
capacity to contract usually depends upon medical evidence offered
at trial. Where it is alleged that a party to a transaction or a contract was non compos mentis, or it is asserted that undue influence
or duress was employed, testimony as to the mental and physical
condition of the party in question is decisive and thus the medical
expert's testimony is the most important part of the case.
Tort Law and the Doctor
The most significant area of contact and friction between law
and medicine is that which is called "tort law." The doctor plays a
leading role, as witness or as defendant, in most tort cases. He is
indispensable as a witness because in order to maintain a case based
upon negligence the plaintiff must prove that he was damaged and
that ordinarily entails medical proof. Medical testimony also is
perhaps the most important part of workmen's compensation proceedings. This is one of the most likely spots for interprofessional
cooperation in education. A seminar course for law students, or
law and medical students, led by law teachers and doctors, can be
an exciting and valuable course. As a minimum, such a course would
undertake to inform the law student about some medical terminology, a little about anatomy and the nervous system, how to read
32 PocAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 66.
33W. VA. CODE c. 30, art. 6, § 8 (Michie 1955). Dr. Began,

id., states:

"The consent of the husband or wife or next of kin of the deceased is a

prerequisite to the performance of an autopsy, unless the autopsy is performed,
in accordance with the law, by the direction of the coroner or other authorized
persons.
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medical reports and perhaps something about reading X-rays, and
the diagnosis and treatment of the particular diseases selected for
the study. Also, he might learn the names of standard medical
treatises and how to use a medical library. It would be hoped that
one by-product of such a seminar would be a better appreciation of
the problems of each profession and an understanding of the other
profession's viewpoint.
Although I am extremely interested in medicolegal education
for the law student, perhaps a brief discussion of malpractice suits
would be more provocative. Doctors are greatly concerned over the
tremendous increase in such suits. Malpractice cases have doubled
since 1946, and in some areas have increased 350 percent. 34 Premiums for malpractice insurance have doubled. 35 This increase has
occurred at a time when the standard of medical competence is at
its highest level. The prospect of such suits creates fear, misunderstanding, and resentment on the part of doctors, and unquestionably
such contingent liability has had serious repercussions on the doctorpatient relationship. It becomes necessary for the doctor to think of
protecting himself even while he is caring for the patient. It has
been suggested that the wise doctor will exhaust every possible
laboratory aid in every case; he will, on the slightest indication
bring consultants into the case; and he will prefer to keep the patient
a longer rather than a shorter time in the hospital. 36 It is hoped
that by these means the hazard to the physician is decreased, although the cost to the patient is increased. It is also recommended
that full, complete, and accurate reports be kept by the doctor and
that he should carefully check hospital records, and that extraneous
or facetious remarks should not be put in medical records. Studies
have found that loose talk about colleagues is one of the prime
causes of the instigation of malpractice suits and doctors are continually being warned to desist from damaging criticism. Suits for
fees may provoke counterclaims for malpractice.
An extreme view is that malpractice suits result from a conspiracy between an ignorant disgruntled patient and a scheming
shyster who is stimulated by his contingent fee. Its counterpart is
that the medical profession is itself engaged in a gigantic conspiracy
to cover up, hide, and protect incompetent quacks who victimize
34

REG.AN, supra note 1 at 11.
35 Ibid.

36 Id. at 17.
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helpless patients. Both extremes are untenable and such rancor but
adds fuel to the flames of professional misunderstanding. I suspect
that neither profession has a corner on the market in honor, competence, or integrity. I also suspect that so long as it is human to
err, mistakes will be made by even competent doctors and lawyers.
Rejecting the viewpoint of the extremist, what's the fuss all
about? Does the law itself, as distinguished from the machinations
of counsel, give rise to this friction? Perhaps a brief look at the malpractice suit may suggest some of the reasons for misunderstanding.
First of all, it should be appreciated that in legal theory the
malpractice suit is sui generis, in a class by itself, in that there is a
modification of the rules which ordinarily pertain in negligence litigation. In the ordinary case, the liability issue centers around the
problem of whether or not the defendant behaved reasonably under
the circumstances. If he was careless, inattentive, or the accident
was caused by his inadvertence, it may be found that he was negligent. It is not necessary that his conduct or failure to act have a
connotation of recklessness, wantonness, or gross negligence-he
may be liable for a momentary lapse. There is no implication that
he is a "bad man" or that he engaged in anti-social conduct, the
inference is merely that in a particular instance he failed to measure
up to the objective standard of the man of ordinary prudence. Unless
it is a flagrant case on the facts, the parties, the court, the jury, and
the public appreciate that "there but for the grace of God, go I."
Contrast with this the implication which is drawn whenever a doctor
is found guilty of malpractice. When liability is imposed upon a doctor it is not regarded as a momentary lapse of a usually competent
physician, rather, the inference is that he engaged in unprofessional
conduct. The stigma is equivalent to that where a citizen is convicted of criminal or willful and wanton misconduct. At least one
reason why this is so in malpractice cases, is that malpractice, by
definition, is a breach of professional duty which occasions injury
to the patient. It imputes more than mere negligence. Theoretically,
the law applies a special standard, reflecting the medical notion of
unprofessional conduct, rather than the usual reasonable man test.
This tailor-made standard, in jurisprudential theory, makes it
difficult to prove a malpractice case and is a protection for the doctor,
yet, paradoxically, what was intended as a dispensation or as deference to medical judgment, may boomerang. This occurs because
the issue usually is determined by a jury. A jury may misunderstand
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or disregard the court's instructions; a juror naturally may identify
himself with the patient or sympathize with him; and perhaps more
important, the jury may naively assume that anything short of medical perfection in this scientific age is not to be condoned. In effect
then, the jury although instructed in terms of a special standard may
actually superimpose a stringent duty of care and a lapse for which
an ordinary mortal might be forgiven assumes exaggerated dimensions where a doctor is involved. Let me illustrate. Do you suppose
that a jury, regardless of instructions, might impose a much higher
standard of care on the driver of a loaded school bus than upon an
ordinary driver? Might not there be something comparable here?
We are dealing with one of the most personal and intimate of human
relations, where typically there is helplessness, trust, and ignorance
on one side, and expertness and professed skill on the other. Due to
these reasons, among others, the jury might not only reject the special standard but in practice may hold a doctor to a higher accountability than the average defendant.
This may be but a phase of the current lapse from the traditional
negligence formula in personal injury litigation. A number of observers have noted that negligence is rapidly losing, if it has not
entirely lost, its character as a branch of "fault" liability, and that
persons who actually cause harm are being saddled with the loss
even though there was no blameworthiness. 37 Unquestionably, there
has been an increasing tendency in personal injury suits for courts to
defer to the jury's sense of justice and it is believed that usually a
jury assumes that the defendant carries insurance and hence a verdict in the plaintiffs favor averts the calamity of having the loss
placed on any one person's shoulders, since the institution of insurance will diffuse the cost.
If there is any substance to this rationale, it would appear that
doctors are being caught on the escalator which goes to more and
larger plaintiffs recoveries, and in addition may be taken for the
ride because a jury frequently assumes a good doctor makes no mistakes and that in any event the doctor is insured or better able than
the patient to pay for the harm done. If such are the realities of the
moment, what are the alternatives? One possibility would be to
37

Pnossmi, TORTs 316 (2d ed. 1955); EHPENZWEG, NEGLIGENCE WrrHOUT
FAuLT (1951); Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. RExv. 564
(1952); McNiece and Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete? 26 ST.
JoAN's L. BEv. 255 (1952); James, Accident Proneness and Accident Law,
68 HI- v. L. BEv. 769 (1950).
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frankly abandon what now may be a pretense of a special standard
and to avowedly make the doctor, like the lawyer, merchant and
chief, liable for mere negligence in his professional life as he already
is in his personal life. If the trend continues, the doctor then would
become a virtual insurer as to his professional expertness as he already is as to his driving skill. Insurance companies would pay the
verdicts, premiums would go up, and fees would be hiked to pay the
increased cost of the premiums. No logical basis would be left for
any imputation of gross incompetence merely because the patient
collected. Whether we like it or not, realistically, we may predict
that this probably will be the "law in action" in many states, and the
minimum that may be salvaged is an awareness that liability does
not connote fault.
Opposing this trend, many strong judges may retain a taut
check on malpractice suits and tighten and batten down the hatches
of legal procedure so that a malpractice case will not reach the jury
unless there is substantial evidence of professional incompetence.
Adherence to this traditional approach depends in large measure
upon the personality and philosophy of the particular court and its
theory as to division of labor between court and jury. As previously
stated, the trend, rightly or wrongly, is to show deference for the
jury, perhaps on the theory that it reflects the sentiment of the community.
A very remote possibility, which I imagine would find acceptance only within the medical profession, would be to require a finding of incompetence by a panel or medical board on the malpractice
issue and to take that fact question out of the hands of the court and
jury. I hope that this will not be construed as a jeremiad, but frankly
I foresee no hope of any lessening of responsibility. An increasing
liability appears inevitable. I only hope that there will be a corresponding decrease in the opprobrium now attached to malpractice
liability.
We have spoken of a special standard in malpractice cases
which differs from that of the ordinary prudent man. Perhaps we
should look at it a little more closely. In the usual case, in effect, a
defendant may be held liable for acting unreasonable under the circumstances. Reasonableness is determined by such considerations
as the foreseeabiity of harm, magnitude and kind or risk, and the
utility of the defendant's action or forbearance. But a tradition or
custom of doing things in a certain way is not conclusive. For
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example, in The T. 1. Hooper,38 judge Learned Hand held that a
jury properly might find negligence where a coastal vessel, per custom, failed to have a radio aboard to receive storm warnings, if in
their opinion a reasonable skipper would have his vessel so equipped.
The fact that other vessels operated without radios was not determinative. In the case of the medical practitioner, however, the standard
of care theoretically is particularized and anchored in custom in that
the physician or surgeon merely undertakes to exercise that degree of
care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by reputable practitioners in the same or similar localities in similar cases. The custom
of the vicinage sets the standard. What local doctors would have
done is the criterion.
This means, in theory, that neither the highest, nor even a high
degree of care and skill is required of a physician undertaking the
care of a patient.39 He is not required to exercise the highest degree
of care and skill and diligence possible in the treatment of an injury
or a disease unless by special contract he has assumed to do so, but
he may be liable for a mistake or error so gross as to be inconsistent
with the degree of skill it is his duty to possess. 40 Of course, if the
defendant-doctor is a specialist, a greater degree of skill is required,
and he is judged by the degree of skill which is ordinarily exercised
by specialists in the same field of practice in the same or similar
localities.41 Theoretically, the individual doctor has his competence
or incompetence in the particular instance measured by the average
in the profession, not by its geniuses, and the jury will be so instructed. However, it may be doubted that this sinks through to
many juries which may assume that even an average doctor simply
does not make mistakes.
In flagrant cases, there really is no problem of degree of skill and
care. Thus, where a nearsighted or careless doctor tied a ligature
about the child's penis instead of around the umbilical cord, 42 or left
a four inch rubber tube in a patient's body,43 made a spinal puncture
upon the wrong patient,44 failed to administer insulin to a diabetic
38 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
39
Dyev. Corbin, 59 W. Va. 266, 53 S.E. 147 (1906).
40 Vaughan v. Memorial Hospital, 100
41 REGAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 56.

W. Va. 290, 130 S.E. 481 (1925).

42

Brooke v. Clark, 57 Tex. 105 (1882).
Saucier v. Ross, 197 Ala. 603, 73 So. 40 (1915).
44 Gill v. Selling, 125 Ore. 587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928).
43
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before and after an operation, 45 left forceps in the abdomen, 46 failed
to put silver nitrate in the eyes of a new born child,47 failed to X-ray
a fractured leg,4 s or used non-sterile instruments, 49 it is idle to speak
of degrees of care because under almost any standard there was
negligence. In these cases there was a failure to follow good practice. Dr. Regan, from his study of the cases, concludes that the
physician must:
1. Not neglect nor abandon his patient.
2. Give his patient sufficient attention.
8. Not experiment.
4. Proceed diligently, without unnecessary delay.
5. Follow good practice, common practice, in diagnosis and
treatment.
6. Find or anticipate any condition reasonably determinable
or reasonably to develop.
7. Utilize indicated diagnostic aids.
8. Obtain legal consent to operate and for autopsy.
9. Give proper instructions for the care of patients and for the
protection of those coming in contact with the patient.
10. And must fulfill the terms of a special contract if he makes
one. 50
In effect, the individual diagnosis and treatment must be in line
with the requirements of good medical practice. Good medical practice is presumed to be average care and skill practiced in the community, and if a particular doctor fails to meet such standard, due
to negligence, ignorance, willful departure from standard practice,
or breaks the law (as by operating without consent) he may be held
liable for malpractice. 51
45 Greenstein v. Fornell, 143 Misc. 880, 257 N.Y. Supp. 673 (1932).

McGrady v. Brink, 195 Wash. 626, 81 P.2d 800 (1938).
7 Walden v. Jones, 289 Ky. 395, 158 S.W.2d 609 (1942).
48 Stoll v. Balazs, 32 Ohio App. 117, 167 N.E. 522 (1929).
49 Clemens v. Smith, 170 Ore. 400, 134 P.2d 424 (1943).
50 REGAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 26.
51 Ibid.
46

4
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For our purposes, the significant thing is that malpractice is
coming more and more to be synonymous with negligence and is
losing its original connotation of gross professional incompetence.
If the departure from good practice is willful, due to ignorance, or
carelessness, there may be liability if damage results. From the doctor's standpoint, only professional incompetence of a serious nature
should be actionable, but from the attorney's and jury's point of
view, doctors should be liable for their negligence, whether slight
or gross. This, I believe, is the basis for professional misunderstanding because not only has the favorable special standard of care become illusory but in addition the invidious connotation of malpractice remains. Insult is added to injury.
It is important to appreciate that the doctor's resentment of
malpractice suits is not a squeal because he has been hit in his
pocketbook. The fact that most doctors carry malpractice insurance
affords scant comfort. It is not the contingency of financial liability
that is disturbing so much as the irreparable harm such litigation
may cause to professional reputation. Truly, he who robs a doctor
of his good name, makes him poor indeed. Moreover, the doctor,
like other professional men, is hypersensitive to criticism and quick
to resent aspersions.
Further antagonism between the professions is occasioned by
rules of evidence which in most jurisdictions require the plaintiff to
prove his case by expert witnesses unless the facts are within the
common knowledge and experience of laymen or obvious to the nonexpert.52 For years many lawyers complained that they had difficulty in obtaining such testimony due to an understandable reluctance on the part of colleagues to stigmatize a doctor as guilty of
malpractice or negligence. I understand that this is no longer a
substantial problem for plaintiff's lawyers in urban areas but may
still be a barrier to a merited recovery in rural sections. I suppose
that if we assume a case of gross incompetence most of us would
agree that there is a substantial miscarriage of justice if a patient
entitled to reparation is denied recovery because of the unwillingness of doctors to testify as to the facts. On the other hand, we might
understand the reluctance to testify if it was merely a momentary
lapse by a reputable physician. The doctor has a great deal at stake.
Upfortunately, the patient may be hurt just as badly in either case.
The increasing use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is counter5

2 Hovell v. Bigart, 108 W. Va. 560, 152 S.E. 823 (1930).
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acting the usual requirement of expert testimony and where adopted
tends to place the doctor on the same footing as the ordinary citizen
in negligence cases.
I agree with my doctor friends that perhaps we expect too much
of them and that it is a serious thing to impose liability for professional negligence. There is little solace in the thought that one reason for exacting such liability is the myth of medical omnipotence
and that perversely the profession is being paid a compliment by
the idea that it is composed largely of supermen. We expect miracles
to be the standard order of procedure. We forget that medicine
still is more of an art than a science. And we often fail to recognize
that good judgment is the fortunate alternative that hindsight confirms. I think that the doctor may be caught in a squeeze between legal
theory and practice and that perhaps the only practicable remedy
may be to abandon the theoretically protective standard, to frankly
make him liable for mere negligence (as juries are doing anyway)
and to thus remove the unfortunate stigma that now is implicit in
the term malpractice.
The Doctor as a Citizen
The Hippocratic Oath contains the vow that a doctor "will
keep pure and holy" both his life and his art, that he "will abstain
from all intentional wrongdoing and harm." The Principles of Medical Ethics promulgated by the American Medical Association, specify that a physician should be "an upright man, instructed in the art
of healing," and that "he must keep himself pure in character and be
diligent and conscientious in caring for the sick."r3 Further, the
Principles of Ethics cites with approval Hippocrates' admonition that
"he should also be modest, sober, patient, prompt to do his whole
duty without anxiety; pious without going so far as superstition,
conducting himself with propriety in his profession and in all the
actions of his life."
This glowing description, for the law student, may call to mind
A. P. Herbert's characterization of the mythical "reasonable man" in
the law of torts:
"this excellent but odious character stands like a monument in
our Courts of Justice, vainly appealing to his fellow-citizens to
order their lives after his own example. He is an ideal, a stand53 Principles of Medical Ethics c. 1, § 1.
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ard, the embodiment of all those qualities which we demand of
the good citizen... He is one who invariably looks where he is
going, and is careful to examine the immediate foreground before he executes a leap or a bound; who neither star-gazes nor
is lost in meditation when approaching trapdoors or the margin
of a dock; ... who will inform himself of the history and habits
of a dog before administering a caress;... who'never drives his
ball until those in front of him have definitely vacated the
putting-green which is his own objective; who never from one
year's end to another makes an excessive demand upon his wife,
his neighbors, his ox, or his ass; ... who never swears, gambles,
or loses his temper; who uses nothing except in moderation, and
even while he flogs his child is meditating on the golden mean
."54

Thus, out of the whole cloth, the law has created the reasonable
man who will serve as the perfect patient for the ideal doctor of
Hippocrates. Utopia is at hand! But seriously, we expect more of
doctors and lawyers than of other men. And it is always something
of a shock when they prove all too human. As professional men we
are dedicated to careers of public service, assume a fiduciary duty to
those we serve, and relegate the profit motive to a place of secondary
importance. To the extent that law or medicine takes on an aspect
of business and financial gain becomes a matter of primary importance, professional identity is lost, and all the gray flannel men from
Madison Avenue can't put it together again.
In addition to the responsibilities of good citizenship and the
high standards of moral character which are imposed upon the doctor, due to the Principles of Ethics, he is specifically obligated to
"observe the laws regulating the practice of medicine" and not
to
assist others to evade such laws, 5 and it is his public duty to help
enforce the laws of his community and to help sustain institutions
which advance the cause of humanity. 6 In other words, there is a
professional obligation that a physician be a law-abiding citizen and
observe the spirit as well as the letter of the law.
In general, the physician, if he has the time, enjoys the rights
and privileges of citizenship and is saddled with its obligations, although the nature of his profession may occasion some modification.
In West Virginia, for example, a quick look at your Code reveals
that practicing physicians and dentists are exempt but not disquali54 HERaBmT, MIsLEADiNG CAs s IN THE COIMON LAw 12-16 (1930).

55 Principles of Medical Ethics c. 1, § 11.
56 Id. c. 8, . 1.
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fled from jury service;5 7 ferrymen have a duty to give them prompt
service; 58 some of the provisions of the liquor control act are inapplicable5 9 but due to the Hippocratic admonition to stay sober that's
of little help; a doctor may be summoned to assist at a coroner's
inquest; 60 and most interesting is the monopoly granted for the use
of the prefix "Dr."61 It may come as something of a shock to academic doctors to learn that the use of the title "doctor" (without
using the appropriate letters to designate their degree), in any letter,
business card, or advertisement, is a misdemeanor.
One of the most important public duties of physicians is to
assist the law in determining issues of responsibility. Although,
ultimately, the concept of responsibility is a philosophic one, which
the courts are as well equipped to answer as medical practitioners,
nonetheless the basis for the moral judgment may hinge upon the
expert's estimate as to the mental condition of the alleged offender.
Today, enlightened jurisdictions are not relying upon the prosecution or defense to produce such evidence but the court upon its
motion may require a medical examination of the accused. In Pittsburgh, the Behavior Clinic is available for the criminal courts, and a
judge may, and usually does, refer an accused to the clinic where
there is any issue as to his mental condition at the time of the alleged
offense or at the time of trial. Although the findings and conclusions
of the clinic are not obligatory on the court, they are usually accepted and the trial may proceed or be continued according to the
nature of the report. The practical effect of the expert's opinion is to
cause a dismissal where the accused is deemed to have been incompetent at the time of the crime, or to occasion a continuance where
he later became incompetent and is unable to stand trial, the alleged
offender being subject to a later trial when and if his condition
improves.
Medical examinations may also occur after conviction when the
issue is what disposition should be made in the particular case. In
California, a state board (adult authority) determines, in most cases,
where a particular convicted person should be institutionalized, and
in Pennsylvania, a classification center makes a similar determina57W. VA. CODE C. 52, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1955).
58 Id. c. 17, art. 18, § 13.
59 Id. c. 60, art. 6, § 5.
60 Id. c. 61, art. 12, § 9.
61 Id. c. 61, art. 10, § 21.
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tion. The nature and character of the criminal as well as his crime
is considered by such boards. This is but an interesting phase of the
current trend towards personalized treatment of offenders and an
emphasis upon rehabilitation rather than punishment. From the
standpoint of the relation of law and medicine, this is one of the
areas where there is increasing cooperation and teamplay.
Constitutional problems are raised, however, if the issue of
responsibility is taken away from the court and jury and committed
solely to the judgment of a board or panel, however expert it may
be.62 For this reason, a board or clinic's conclusions cannot be made
mandatory.
Furthermore, contrary to military tradition, the selective service
act recognizes the special ability of doctors and accords them special
treatment. Some ordinances or statutes extend a privilege to ignore
speed laws when answering emergency calls, some offices may be
filled only by physicians, and in some states medical tools and instruments are exempt from the attachment of creditors.
These, then, are some of the professional responsibilities and
privileges imposed on doctors. If we had the time, we might explore
the problem of actual or apparant conflict between a doctor's duty
to his patient and his duty to 63
assist law enforcement, but we had
best move on to our final topic.

The Legal Control of the Doctor and Medicine
Alfred North Whitehead has emphasized freedom of association and self-regulation as important attributes of a democratic society. That philosopher believes that an ideal free society may
emerge when it is composed of independent, semi-autonomous units,
taking orders from no one and enforcing their own discipline in view
of their distinctive functions.64 He visualizes institutional selfdetermination for "voluntary association." This would result in
private law or nonjudicial control.
62 See State v. Lange, 168 La. 958, 123 So. 639, 4 TutL. L. REv. 819
(1929) (holding unconstitutional a statute which withdrew insanity issue from

the court and placed it in hands of a commission).
63. It would seem that there may be such a conflict, where, as in West
Virginia, communications between patient and doctor are not recognized as
privileged by law but the doctor's ethical duty to his patient warrants silence.
Again, police authorities may demand that a patient be available for questioning at a time when medical judgment opposes such interference.
64 See Whitehead's essay, Aspects of Freedom, in ANsms,
Fnmanom: ITs
MANWGc 42-67 (1940).
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Granted that law is but one means of social control, there is
little evidence that Whitehead's Utopia is likely to come to pass.
The tendency, after some hesitation, is in the opposite direction.
For example, an arbitrary exclusion or wrongful expulsion from a
trade union will be reviewed by the courts. 5 The law regards one's
interest in pursuing a trade or a profession as a "property right",
and teachers, lawyers, and others may not be arbitrarily deprived of
the chance to earn their livelihoods. Procedural due process may be
imposed. But how far should the law go in regulating the internal
affairs of a profession?
In Bernstein v. Alameda-ContraCosta Medical Ass'nO6 a doctor
made a workmen's compensation report which contained derogatory
statements about a colleague's examination of the claimant's decedent. Since the report was received into evidence, Dr. Bernstein
had the status of a witness. His local medical association, believing
that his statements constituted a violation of medical ethics, commenced disciplinary proceedings. The California court enjoined
such action on the ground that it would hamper due administration
of justice and because the legal privilege of witnesses, which frees
them from liability for slander, precluded such punitive action.
In another recent case, Boswell v. Board of Medical Examiners,67 a Nevada physician, in private conversation, referred to one
of his fellow doctors as the "city drunk," said that the second was
"nothing but a lousy midwife who had probably killed more patients
... than she had ever helped," and that the only other doctor in the
town was incapable of handling medical work expected of him. The
physician also said of the second doctor that she had never performed operations but treated appendicitis with a hot enema and
had left a large percentage of the women of the county with their
"insides hanging out" due to the butchery to which they were exposed under her care, and that she had bled the people of her
community of all the money possible. The legal question was
whether these statements constitute "conduct unbecoming a person
licensed to practice medicine or detrimental to the best interests of
the public" within a statute authorizing the state board to revoke
medical licenses for unprofessional conduct.
65 See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944);
Sanders v. International Ass'n Bridge Workers, 130 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Ky.

1955).

06 293 P.2d 832 (Cal. 1956).
67 293 P.2d 424 (Nev. 1956).
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The Nevada court held that Dr. Boswell's license could not be
revoked because of his abusive language and enjoined the proceedings of the medical board. It rejected the board's argument that such
criticism caused patients to lose confidence in the medical profession and that the use of such language demonstrated that the doctor
was unfit to practice medicine, saying "It has never been held that
the public health, safety, or morals requires protection through the
suppression of criticism of the medical profession as a whole, no
matter how harsh the terms in which such criticism is expressed.
The common sense and sound judgment of the public in its reaction
to unwarranted or unjust criticism of individual doctors or of the
medical profession accords a far better protection than the one
sought here by the board of medical examiners." The court felt
that such charges would result in public resentment against the
critic, and in conclusion stated, "Neither the right of individual
practitioners to protect themselves nor the right of the medical profession to protect itself may be promoted under the provisions of a
statute whose sole purpose is the protection of the public, and whose
sole justification lies in the police power of the state exercised to
that end."
Now one would not have to be a Samuel Johnson to take issue
with this Boswell or the decision or logic of the court. Here, as distinguished from the California case, there is ino direct or indirect
interference with the judicial process. True, the law affords a
remedy to the slandered colleagues if a private suit for defamation
were brought, but over and beyond the private interests of any of
the parties there is a serious question of the public interest in the
maintenance of high professional standards. Does the decision promote medical ethics? Would the same result be reached if a medical
society undertook to discipline the offending doctor? Should the
judiciary presume to pass upon such matters? Would it not be intermeddling if courts undertook to do more than insure fair procedure?
Isn't the medical profession better equipped to promulgate standards
of conduct and to define what constitutes "unprofessional conduct"?
The problem of governmental control of the medical profession
is too large a topic for present consideration. In general, state laws
undertake to prescribe statutory grounds for admission, licensing,
suspension, and revocation. In West Virginia, the term "practice of
medicine and surgery" is defined to mean "the treatment of any
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human ailment or infirmity by any method."6s Graduates of Class A
medical schools who have had a minimum of two years pre-medical
education, may be able to take written and oral examinations "covering all essential branches of the science of medicine and surgery."
The state board may refuse a license to a person guilty of a felony
or gross immorality, or one addicted to drunkenness or habitual use
or narcotics, and malpractice or fraud in procuring a license. Licenses may be revoked for the same causes.6 9 Practicing without a
license is a misdemeanor and the use of a false diploma is a felony. 70
Exceptions are made as to the admission of foreign trained physicians and medics in the armed services. Note that under the West
Virginia statutes, both criminal penalties and administrative procedure are provided for in certain instances.
Over and beyond such statutory provisions, certain standards
and ethics are subject to private enforcement. A doctor may be
subjected to such private sanctions as being barred from admission
to a medical society or a hospital staff, or expelled therefrom or
denied privileges. As we saw in the California case, and as is shown
by American Medical Ass'n v. United States,71 such private sanctions
are subject to judicial review.
Moreover, certain reports are required of doctors. He may be
required to report gunshot or knife wounds; to submit a report on
serological tests of pregnant women to the state laboratory; 72 to keep
detailed records and to make reports regarding narcotics; 73 to report
venereal disease 74 and communicable diseases; 75 and vital statistics
concerning birth and death."6 Perhaps I should add the obligation
of keeping proper records for the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
VA. CODE c. 30, art 3, § 1 (Michie 1955).
69 See Mingo County Med. Soc'y v. Simon, 124 W. Va. 493, 20 S.E.2d
807 (1942) (evidence of malpractice and that physician testified falsely before
Public Health Council respecting his citizenship, that lie had got another
physician to make a false affidavit, and had proposed fee-splitting, warranted
revocation of license for "gross immorality").
70W. VA. CODE c. 80, art. 3, § 9 (Michie 1955).
71317 U.S. 519 (1943).
72W. VA. CODE C. 16, art. 4, § 26 (Michie 1955).
68 W.

73 Id. c. 16, art. 8A, § 1, and the federal Harrison Act, 26 U.S.C.A. 2550
et seq. (1955).
74 Id. c. 16, art. 4, § 6.
75 Id. c. 16, art. 2, § 1.
76 Id. c. 16, art. 5, § 6.
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Fee splitting is not only a violation of the Principles of Medical
Ethics 77 but is also proscribed by statute in West Virginia as a
misdemeanor.7
One of the more interesting and debatable areas of governmental regulation of medicine is with regard to confidential communications between patient and doctor. At common law there is no legal
recognition of a privilege to withhold such communications from a
court. The Hippocratic Oath, however, provides "And whatsoever
I shall see or hear in the course of my profession, as well as outside
my profession, in my intercourse with men, if it be what should
not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things
to be holy secrets." The Principles of Medical Ethics 79 provide that
such confidences should not be revealed "unless their revelation is
required by the laws of the state." In West Virginia, the common
law is in effect except in proceedings before justices or constables,
and no privilege is recognized.8 0 In about half the states, statutes
have accorded a complete privilege so that unless waived by the
client, a doctor may not testify as to any communications he received
in a confidential capacity. In still other states, such as Pennsylvania,
there is a limited privilege in that a doctor may not testify in a civil
case without his patient's consent but can be compelled to do so in a
criminal prosecution. It has been observed that although such
statutes were designed to reflect medical ethics, the privilege usually
has been invoked to protect from disclosure matters which have not
been kept secret from friends and neighbors and which the court
should know about. The American Bar Association has proposed
that disclosure should be a matter of discretion for the trial judge.-1
A discussion on the topic of law and medicine would not be
complete without some reference to the role of the doctor as an
expert witness. It has been observed that there is an almost unreasoning fear on the part of many doctors to taking the witness
stand. A legal expert on such matters, Irving Goldstein, asserts that
the key to the problem is keeping proper and complete medical
records, and claims that if this is done nine out of ten cases will be
77 C. 1, § 6.
78 W. VA. CODE c.

80, art. 3, § 8 (Michie 1955).

79 C. 2, § 2.

80 See W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 16, § 10 (Michie 1955); and Molr v.
Mohr,8 1119 W. Va. 253, 193 S.E. 121 (1937).
See Chafee, Privileged Communications, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1948).
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settled and never reach trial 82 In the cases that do reach the litigation stage, a well prepared doctor who testifies truthfully and without exaggeration has but little to fear from cross-examination.
However, if the doctor is unprepared, or if he varies from the normal
and standard procedure, he may anticipate a direct attack upon his
testimony during cross-examination. It is important to spend considerable time with counsel before appearing as a witness and to be
careful not to get out on a limb. Opposing counsel may be a tree
surgeon. A considerate counsel may anticipate the cross-examiner
if permitted to do so, by asking on direct examination whether the
case had previously been discussed, whether the doctor has testified
in similar cases before, and on which side, and what arrangements
have been made for his compensation.8 3 The standard tactics of
impeachment are thus anticipated. Finally, humility is most becoming a doctor or any expert, and it is well to remember that "the
Godly trust not their own righteousness." In matters of judgment it is
best not to deal in absolutes.
Unquestionably, the "battle of experts" which frequently occurs
in criminal or civil cases has had a serious effect upon the prestige of
the medical profession. It is a prime cause of cynicism among
lawyers. Various ideas have been proposed to deal with this problem. The so-called Minnesota plan contemplates an investigation
by the profession itself whenever perjury is suspected or unprofessional opinions are expressed from the witness stand by doctors. A
recent New York study reaffirms the old recommendation of panels
of impartial experts to assist the court. It would seem that there
are at least two factors which have contributed to confusion and
irreconcilable testimony. In the first place, often we are dealing
with opinion rather than fact, and there is a sound basis for differences in judgment. Experts may be reasonable in reaching opposite conclusions. In the second place, where the issue is insanity,
a legal rather than a medical term, the expert is being asked an
opinion as to a legal conclusion rather than a medical fact, and
although the medical experts agree on the medical facts they may
disagree as to the legal conclusion to be drawn therefrom, particularly when there is ambiguity in the terms used. Moreover, conflicting opinions may be predicted on different sets of facts. Over
and beyond this, however, there has been an unhealthy tendency
82 Goldstein, Medical Expert Testimony, PnocEExDnns MEDICOLEGAL SYMPosIUMs 51 (1956).
83 Halpem, Medico-Legal Problems, 17 U. Pr. L. Rsv. 57, 65 (1955).
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on the part of a few doctors to be partisan and to identify themselves
too intimately with either plaintiff or defendant's counsel to the
extent that a neutral observer would not regard them as unbiased.
Conclusion
We have examined, in a superficial way, a few of the problems
that are the mutual concern of doctors and lawyers. We have few
answers for any of these problems. But we do not regard any of
them as insurmountable nor as susceptible to an easy solution. Professional education can and must do more to lay a foundation for
better understanding; there is a bond between our professions; and
we must learn the other fellow's viewpoint. If we understand one
another better one source of hostility will be eliminated. It is not
too much to ask our educational institutions to do more than has
been done in the past to bring about an intercommunication between
our professions and to reduce the barriers which have existed all too
long as impediments to understanding. In 1928, Mr. Justice Cardozo
delivered an address to the New York Academy of Medicine in
which he reminded the doctors present of the old belief that the
earliest physician was the priest, just as the earliest judge was the
ruler who uttered the divine command and was the king and priest
combined. From ancient times there has been a close inter-relationship between law and medicine and the closer we work together
the better the chance that our combined efforts will help to solve
some of the pressing problems of our times. Law and medicine are
intertwined so closely that a failure to work together amounts to
working at cross-purposes. Absit invidia.
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